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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM II)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 966 (1994) of 8 December 1994, in which the Council took note of my intention to submit a report on the possible mandate for a new United Nations operation in Angola, based on my assessment of the circumstances, including the maintenance of the cease-fire. The present report contains a detailed description of the objectives and concept of such a new operation, as well as information on its financial aspects and on my efforts to identify potential troop-contributing countries. It also contains information pertinent to a status-of-forces agreement to be concluded with the Government of Angola.

2. By the same resolution, the Council welcomed my decision, as conveyed in my letter of 7 December 1994 (S/1994/1395) to its President, to proceed, in accordance with resolution 952 (1994), with the restoration of the strength of UNAVEM II to its previous level, depending on the extent to which the parties observed an effective cease-fire and provided satisfactory guarantees regarding the safety and security of United Nations personnel. The Council also requested me to ensure that it was regularly informed of further developments in the implementation of the "Acordos de Paz para Angola" (Bicesse accords) signed on 31 May 1991 (S/22609, annex) and the Lusaka Protocol signed on 20 November 1994 (S/1994/1441, annex), as well as on the activities of UNAVEM II.

3. As of 25 January 1995, the number of military observers had been increased from 50 to 171 and of civilian police observers from 18 to 122 (see annex). Before the expiry of the current mandate on 8 February 1995, the combined total of military and police personnel is expected to reach approximately 400. With initial logistic difficulties having been overcome and improved cooperation on the ground with troops of the Government of Angola and the União Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), the United Nations military and police elements have been deployed to 22 team sites throughout the country, in addition to the headquarters in Luanda and recently established regional headquarters in Huambo, Lubango, Luena, Menongue, Saurimo and Uige. It is expected that, by the beginning of February, over 30 outstations will have been established in the most critical areas.

4. As was mandated by the Security Council, I have continued contingency planning for an enlarged United Nations operation in Angola. I have also intensified contacts with potential contributors to UNAVEM III. I am pleased to inform the Council that various Member States have indicated that they would be ready to contribute a significant number of units and military and police personnel to the new operation. I would also like to express my gratitude to those Member States which, at the request of the Secretariat, have kept their military and police officers on standby in order to deploy them as quickly as possible for the initial stage of the operation.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

5. During the period under review, my Special Representative continued intensive efforts to improve the political atmosphere in Angola and facilitate the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. He met with President José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola and the President of UNITA, Mr. Jonas Savimbi, and with Presidents Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Frederick Chiluba of Zambia and Sam Nujoma of Namibia.

6. A major concern of my Special Representative has been to facilitate a meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi. He is currently in the process of finalizing arrangements for such a meeting, to which both leaders' agreement in principle has been secured.

III. PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE LUSAKA PROTOCOL

7. The Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441) consists essentially of 10 annexes as follows:

Annex 1: Agenda of the Angola peace talks between the Government and UNITA;

Annex 2: Reaffirmation of the acceptance, by the Government and UNITA, of the relevant legal instruments;

Annex 3: Military issues I;

Annex 4: Military issues II;

Annex 5: The police;

Annex 6: National reconciliation;

Annex 7: Completion of the electoral process;

Annex 8: The United Nations mandate and the role of the observers of the "Acordos de Paz" and the Joint Commission;

Annex 9: Timetable for the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol;

Annex 10: Other matters.

8. Military issues covered in annex 3 include the re-establishment of the cease-fire, the withdrawal, quartering and demobilization of all UNITA forces and the disarming of all civilians. Annex 4 addresses the completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and the demobilization of excess personnel. Annex 5 concerns the Angolan National Police, which will include in its ranks a significant number of UNITA members.

9. Annex 6 contains principles of national reconciliation, which include adequate participation of members of UNITA in political, administrative and economic activities, including in the various levels of government (central, provincial, local); the granting of amnesty for all illegal acts committed in the context of the war; the re-establishment of State administration over the entire country; and the special status of the President of UNITA and the security and privileges of that organization's highest members.

10. Annex 7 provides that the Angolan electoral process, left incomplete because of the post-electoral crisis of 1992, must be completed through the holding of the second round of presidential elections, which are to take place once the United Nations has declared that the requisite conditions for this have been fulfilled.

11. Annex 8 deals with the specific tasks that the Government and UNITA wish to entrust to the United Nations in the framework of its expanded operation in Angola and which are detailed in the following sections of the present report. This annex also deals with the Joint Commission, which is charged with overseeing the implementation of all provisions of the "Acordos de Paz" that have yet to be applied and all provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. The Special Representative is to chair the meetings of the Commission, which is composed of representatives of the Government of Angola and UNITA and attended by representatives of Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, in their capacity as observers. The Commission will take the final decision concerning alleged violations of the agreements; these decisions will be made by consensus after the views of the observer States have been heard. The annex also provides definitions of key military terms pertinent to the United Nations mandate.

12. The timetable in annex 9 outlines the actions to be taken by the Government, UNITA and the United Nations to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the Protocol from the day of its initialling until the completion of its implementation.

IV. MAIN OBJECTIVES AND MANDATE OF UNAVEM III

13. It is proposed that an enlarged United Nations operation in Angola, UNAVEM III, be established to assist the parties in restoring peace and achieving national reconciliation in Angola on the basis of the "Acordos de Paz", the Lusaka Protocol and relevant Security Council resolutions. In setting out the concept of operations for UNAVEM III, special consideration needs to be given to the geography of Angola and the conditions prevailing in this war-torn country. It has a total area of 1,246,700 square kilometres, which is almost equal to the territories of France, Spain and the United Kingdom combined, and

has a varied and difficult terrain. The basic infrastructure of the country has been devastated, in some areas almost totally, by 34 years of struggle for independence and civil war. The humanitarian situation is extremely grave, with approximately 3.5 million persons displaced, representing some 35 per cent of the estimated population. The very large number of mines laid throughout the country poses a serious hazard for the population as well as for United Nations activities in support of the peace process.

14. Subject to the agreement of the Security Council, the main features of the new United Nations mandate would be:

(a) Political. To assist in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol by providing good offices and mediation to the parties and taking appropriate initiatives, as necessary, to give impetus to the peace process. In this context, as already mentioned, the Special Representative would chair meetings of the Joint Commission. The Mission would also monitor and verify the extension of State administration throughout the country and the process of national reconciliation;

(b) Military

(i) To supervise, control and verify the disengagement of forces and to monitor the cease-fire;

(ii) To verify information received from the Government and UNITA regarding their forces;

(iii) To verify and monitor all troop movements;

(iv) To assist in the establishment of quartering areas, in cooperation with the parties;

(v) To verify and monitor the withdrawal, quartering and demobilization of UNITA forces;

(vi) To supervise the collection and storage of UNITA armaments;

(vii) To verify the movement of FAA to barracks;

(viii) To verify and monitor the completion of the formation of FAA, and other tasks;

(ix) To verify the free circulation of persons and goods;

(c) Police. To verify and monitor the neutrality of the Angolan National Police, the disarming of civilians, the quartering of the rapid reaction police, and the security arrangements for UNITA leaders;

(d) Humanitarian. To coordinate, facilitate and support humanitarian activities directly linked to the peace process, in particular those relating to the quartering and demobilization of troops and their reintegration in civilian life, as well as participating in mine-clearing activities;

(e) Electoral. To declare formally that all essential requirements for the holding of the second round of presidential elections have been fulfilled; and to support, verify and monitor the entire electoral process.

15. The rules of engagement of the new operation, in accordance with normal practice, would authorize the use of force in self-defence, including against forcible attempts to impede the discharge of the operation's mandate.

16. Based on recent experience with other peace-keeping operations, the activities of the political, military, police, humanitarian and electoral components of the Mission would be coordinated and integrated as necessary, in order to achieve a cost-effective utilization of resources. The Special Representative, on behalf of the Secretary-General, would exercise executive authority over, and command of, all aspects of the operation, which would be completed within the overall time-frame envisaged by the Lusaka Protocol. The Angolan parties would be expected to keep in mind that the international community will not entertain delays in the fulfilment of their obligations under the Lusaka Protocol or extensions of the mandate of the Mission.

V. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. Political aspects

17. Under the Lusaka Protocol, the United Nations is expected to assume a new and major role in the peace process, to provide good offices and mediation, and to chair the Joint Commission as well as the subsidiary bodies that have been established. This would require that the office of my Special Representative be provided with the necessary substantive and support staff.

18. In the area of national reconciliation, experience elsewhere suggests that the Organization could play a useful role in monitoring and helping to reconcile difficulties that might arise. The United Nations is also called upon by the Protocol to certify that the "requisite conditions have been fulfilled for the normalization of the State administration" throughout the country, which implies the extension of the Government's control over the whole national territory. Moreover, at the appropriate time, my Special Representative will have to determine whether all conditions for the holding of the second round of presidential elections have been fulfilled. These conditions involve the provision of all necessary security guarantees for UNITA leaders, free circulation of people and goods, participation of UNITA in the management of State affairs, and the establishment of an atmosphere of tolerance. I therefore believe that it will be necessary to maintain a minimal political presence in each of UNAVEM's six regional headquarters, with a mandate to observe the implementation of the provisions related to national reconciliation and to provide good offices where necessary. This political staff will report to UNAVEM headquarters in Luanda, which will also include human rights specialists.

19. The section of the Lusaka Protocol on national reconciliation attaches particular importance to the need to promote a climate of confidence through the mass media. Accordingly, the Government and UNITA have asked the United Nations to monitor and verify compliance with the cessation of all hostile propaganda. These tasks would require the establishment within UNAVEM of a public

information section, which would also be responsible for the dissemination, through various media and as widely as possible, of information about the goals of the peace process, the obligations of the parties and the role played by the United Nations. It will be recalled that in the post-Bicesse period, serious misconceptions about the mandate of UNAVEM and the respective responsibilities of the Government and UNITA in the peace process were prevalent among the population. As mentioned in my report of 3 January 1995 entitled "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" (S/1995/1), one of the additional lessons learned from recent peace-keeping operations is the need for an effective information capability and, more specifically, for a United Nations radio station. In all operations where such an information capacity has been established, it is recognized as having made an invaluable contribution to the peace process. I strongly believe that, in the circumstances existing in Angola, a United Nations radio station, appropriately staffed and equipped, would play a very useful role.

20. At this stage, it is difficult to predict exactly when the second round of presidential elections will be held in Angola. However, the parties have called on the United Nations to support and verify the whole electoral process. In due course, I will therefore present to the Security Council additional recommendations about United Nations technical assistance to and verification of these elections.

B. Military aspects

21. To ensure the credible verification of the peace process, it will be essential to obtain promptly from the parties all relevant military information. This matter is already being pursued in the framework of the Joint Commission.

22. UNAVEM III monitoring and verification activities will be carried out primarily by military observers stationed at 59 sites throughout the country, including all quartering areas, airports, ports, border areas and other strategic locations. The military observers will monitor the military situation on the ground and the implementation of the military provisions of the Lusaka Protocol; they will also be available to the parties to provide good offices and mediation on the ground. They will verify the departure of mercenaries from Angola, all troop movements, the quartering of UNITA troops and movement of FAA to barracks, the collection and inventory of weapons, the military strength of the parties and the completion of the formation of FAA. The military observers will work closely with government/UNITA joint monitoring groups, conduct independent or joint investigations and enjoy unrestricted access to all facilities and information necessary for the discharge of their duties.

23. In order to carry out the proposed mandate, the Mission will need 350 military observers, many of whom have already been deployed to the mission area, in accordance with Security Council resolution 966 (1994). The military observer component will remain in Angola throughout the entire verification process. In some cases, the military observers will be co-located with United Nations peace-keeping troops, but the security of these observers, who in many cases will be co-located and operate in joint teams with the United Nations police observers, will be the responsibility of the parties. In the Lusaka

Protocol, the parties reiterated their determination "to respect and protect the Mission of the United Nations in Angola", its personnel, facilities and property (see S/1994/1441, annex 8, para. 4).

24. According to the Lusaka Protocol and subsequent agreements, United Nations troops would be called upon to perform several crucial tasks. They would be deployed in various locations to control the quartering areas; each area would be a few square kilometres in size and would accommodate a large number of troops, often accompanied by their families. In the atmosphere currently prevailing in the country, it would be essential to reassure combatants and the population at large that there would be no fresh outbreak of hostilities. United Nations troops would have to ensure that armed elements of both sides remain separated throughout the quartering and demobilization process and, to this end, would patrol the perimeter of the quartering areas as well as the surrounding areas extensively. They would also guard the weapons collected from UNITA troops in quartering areas, later transporting them to regional depots for delivery into United Nations custody. United Nations infantry units would escort humanitarian convoys, assist in preventing armed elements from interfering with activities related to the peace process and protect United Nations personnel and property. After the conclusion of the demobilization process, United Nations troops would facilitate the free circulation of people and goods in Angola, an essential element of the Lusaka agreements. Given that the Angolan parties are asking the United Nations to deploy troops in 14 quartering areas and 8 main weapons storage locations throughout the country, it would be necessary to have 22 to 24 self-sustained infantry companies, which would be drawn from six logistically self-contained infantry battalions.

25. In view of the ravaged infrastructure in Angola, a logistic unit or three independent logistic companies would be needed for several months to support the operation during its initial phase.

26. It would also be vital to deploy three independent engineer squadrons/ companies alongside the infantry units to assist in the establishment of the quartering areas, set up water-supply points, assist in repairing main access routes and perform other specialized tasks. Among these would be to assist in mine-clearance activities on the understanding, however, that the primary responsibility for de-mining in Angola must rest with the Government and UNITA. In the early stages of the operation, it is expected that the parties would conduct a preliminary mine sweep of all United Nations deployment sites and quartering areas. This would be supplemented by a mine verification of these sites through contractual arrangements with private firms and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) already operating in the region. The earliest possible funding for this indispensable activity would be required. UNAVEM engineers would then assist in enlarging the clear areas and would be equipped with heavy-duty mine-clearance equipment, including rollers and mobile bridging equipment. During the initial crucial stages of the operation, the Force Commander, in consultation with the Central Mine Action Office, which has been established in Luanda within the United Nations Unit for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, would be in charge of all operational mine-clearance activities by UNAVEM. To address various operational needs in de-mining and to lay down the basis for a national de-mining capacity in Angola, UNAVEM III would provide for a de-mining school to be established by the Central Mine Action Office, 56

military specialists in de-mining, essential training facilities, equipment and services, including medical assistance.

27. The formed units indicated above would be supported by a signals company for triangular communication between UNAVEM, the Government and UNITA troops, the Mission's integral communication network being provided by the civilian administrative component; a small field hospital in Luanda, with two advance dressing stations in Huambo and Luena; a helicopter unit of eight aircraft stationed in six regions for verification and reconnaissance, medical evacuation and emergency supply; as well as command and control functions. It would also be necessary to establish a naval unit, consisting of three patrol boats, to assist in monitoring maritime routes and prevent the illegal delivery of weapons, especially along the northern coast and in the estuary of the Zaire River. Finally, the military component of UNAVEM would include a military police element and a small movement-control unit.

28. The overall strength of the infantry battalions and support units required to perform the tasks described above and create an atmosphere of security, confidence and mutual trust in the country is estimated at 6,450, all ranks, in addition to 265 military staff personnel, 350 military observers and 56 de-mining specialists. The formed units would stay in Angola for up to 12 months after deployment.

29. The quartering of UNITA troops, their demobilization and subsequent social reintegration is one of the key elements of both the peace process and the mandate of UNAVEM III. Delays in the assembly and demobilization of troops, which must be completed within three months, could jeopardize the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. In order, therefore, to assist in the management of assembly areas, as well as in the preparation of UNITA troops for discharge into civilian life, a civilian Demobilization and Reintegration Office will be established within the United Nations Unit for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance. It is envisaged that this Office will consist of 38 international Professional staff, 50 United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) and 45 local personnel. Of these, 30 Professional staff, 50 UNVs and 38 local personnel would be financed from the budget of UNAVEM. The Force Commander, acting on behalf of my Special Representative, and with the assistance of the Unit for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance and United Nations humanitarian agencies, will be responsible for supervising the establishment of quartering areas and their management, as well as for the registration of UNITA personnel and their subsequent demobilization.

30. In order to complete these tasks expeditiously, it is essential that the provision of basic infrastructure, including transport of soldiers to quartering areas, tents, food, clothing, identification documents and initial training programmes for the demobilizing soldiers in assembly areas be included in the budget of UNAVEM III. However, the Government of Angola is expected to make a major contribution to various demobilization activities. All other services related to demobilization and reintegration would be provided by United Nations agencies and NGOs, coordinated by the Unit for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, on the basis of voluntary contributions from the donor community.

31. Under the Lusaka Protocol, it was envisaged that the quartering process would begin 45 days after the initialling of the document, at which time the cantonment areas would be ready and United Nations troops fully deployed. The parties recognize that the implementation schedule must now be adjusted. It is none the less imperative that the quartering process start as soon as possible, otherwise the cease-fire may be jeopardized. This requires that United Nations infantry units be deployed promptly to Angola, and in any case by no later than three months after the adoption of a Security Council resolution on the establishment of UNAVEM III. In order to meet this tight deadline for the induction of United Nations infantry battalions, UNAVEM's military support units and civilian logistic elements must be deployed no later than two months after the adoption of the resolution. It is requested, therefore, that the legislative bodies concerned extend their full cooperation and be as flexible as possible so that the budgetary and procurement arrangements for UNAVEM III can be made expeditiously.

32. At the same time, it would be difficult to justify the deployment of the main body of United Nations infantry unless the Government and UNITA implement, according to the agreed timetable, certain essential initial tasks set out in the Lusaka Protocol. Among these indispensable steps are an effective cessation of hostilities and full disengagement of government and UNITA forces; setting up of verification mechanisms; establishment of reliable communication links between the Government, UNITA and UNAVEM; provision to the United Nations and verification by it of all relevant military data, including troop itineraries; designation of all quartering areas and withdrawal of troops to the nearest barracks; and the early start of de-mining. It would be my intention to request my Special Representative to determine whether these steps have been satisfactorily implemented before proceeding with the actual progressive deployment of the infantry battalions and to inform the Security Council accordingly.

C. Police matters

33. One of the main tasks of the United Nations enlarged Mission in Angola will be to monitor and verify all activities of the Angolan National Police in order to guarantee its neutrality. United Nations police observers will also be tasked with verifying the quartering of the rapid reaction police in eight locations throughout the country and verifying that the weapons available to this force are adapted to the changed nature of its functions, i.e., the maintenance of public order and security. This verification has already begun with the assistance of 126 United Nations police observers, whose deployment to Angola was authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 966 (1994).

34. The civilian police component of UNAVEM III (CIVPOL) would also monitor and verify the collection and storage by the Angolan National Police of arms now in the hands of the civilian population. At the same time, it was agreed that CIVPOL would thoroughly verify the whole process of integration of UNITA members into the Angolan National Police. In accordance with the Lusaka Protocol, 5,500 UNITA personnel would be integrated into the National Police, including 1,200 UNITA members who would join the rapid reaction police.

35. In order to perform the above tasks, United Nations police teams would be stationed in all 18 provinces of Angola, in particular in major population centres, and would regularly visit police facilities and conduct independent investigations on reported violations. CIVPOL would freely receive complaints and information related to the implementation of the police aspects of the Lusaka Protocol. At the same time, however, it would respect the authority of the National Police in the performance of its constitutional duties. CIVPOL has also been asked to verify the activities of the National Police related to the Government's commitment to provide security for the UNITA leaders. It will be important for the police to inspire confidence among the general population, especially in the areas where UNITA has a sizeable presence. All Angolan citizens should be confident that their liberties, rights and freedoms will not be violated.

36. It is estimated that the civilian police component of UNAVEM III would need at least 260 officers, headed by a Chief Superintendent of Police. In the countryside, CIVPOL will be operating in small teams, either independently or jointly with United Nations military observers. The police component will rely on UNAVEM's integrated logistic and communications support system. To perform the above tasks, CIVPOL will be deployed to Angola for the whole duration of the Mission. At the same time, the Lusaka Protocol gives it a major role in monitoring and verifying the conclusion of the electoral process, in particular in providing protection for polling stations and political candidates. The presence of an enlarged United Nations police component at that time could be most useful. Subject to the concurrence of the parties, I will present to the Security Council at a later stage my recommendations about the additional police observers required for the electoral process.

VI. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

37. The signing of the Lusaka Protocol implies profound changes in the nature and scope of the United Nations humanitarian programme in Angola. Relief assistance must now be extended to civilians living in areas that were previously inaccessible because of persistent conflict. Provision must be made for the repatriation of refugees and resettlement of internally displaced persons. The programme must also expand to address the humanitarian aspects of mine clearance, the demobilization of former combatants and their integration into civilian life.

38. The coordination mechanisms developed over the past two years will be strengthened and expanded to address these new humanitarian requirements. Under the authority of my Special Representative, the Unit for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, which has been operational since March 1993, would continue to serve as the coordinating body for all humanitarian operations. The Unit would continue to support and coordinate the efforts of the operational agencies of the United Nations such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP), while mobilizing increased participation by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) in relief and resettlement activities, rehabilitation and, in

particular, the provision of assistance to demobilizing soldiers. Other United Nations agencies such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and UNV would contribute in areas related to their mandates. The Unit would extend its presence throughout the country through its regional field advisers, who would assist United Nations agencies and NGOs at the local level in carrying out their humanitarian programmes, through technical officers and United Nations volunteers posted in the quartering areas and through regional mine-action officers.

39. Two new offices within the Unit for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance will address the humanitarian requirements arising from the peace agreement: the Demobilization and Reintegration Office and the Central Mine Action Office. The Demobilization and Reintegration Office will assist in organizing services for the demobilizing soldiers and programmes to facilitate their return to productive life in civilian society. The Central Mine Action Office will coordinate all activities relating to mines and other explosive devices so as to ensure the safest possible conditions for the deployment of United Nations personnel, the establishment of quartering areas and the implementation of humanitarian assistance operations, including the resettlement of displaced persons.

40. Appropriate arrangements will be made under the direct authority of my Special Representative to ensure efficient collaboration between the Unit for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance and the military and other components of UNAVEM in all areas of mutual concern. Joint working groups on demobilization/ reintegration and mine action composed of UNAVEM and the Unit are already in operation and will be strengthened under the UNAVEM III Mission.

41. Nearly 3.5 million Angolans living in accessible areas are currently receiving humanitarian assistance. Under the guidance of the Unit, a programme has been developed, based on agreements with the Government and UNITA, to ensure the delivery of food and other relief supplies to an average of 15 Angolan cities per week by air and to other locations by road wherever possible. As peace is being consolidated, the emphasis of relief operations will shift towards assistance to newly accessible areas; assistance in support of the quartering process; distribution to vulnerable groups in place of general distributions; the use of overland routes in addition to air corridors; and support for the revitalization of agricultural production to increase self-sufficiency in the supply of food.

42. Approximately 112,000 returnees and other vulnerable groups living near resettlement areas are receiving humanitarian assistance from UNHCR. In addition, some 280,000 Angolan refugees live in neighbouring countries, particularly the Congo, Namibia, Zaire and Zambia. At least 100,000 of these refugees are expected to return to Angola in 1995. Effective repatriation will require close coordination between UNHCR and UNAVEM, particularly in the following areas:

(a) Security at designated entry points and on repatriation routes;

(b) Inspection of convoys transporting returning refugees in the framework of UNAVEM's monitoring and verification responsibilities at entry points.

In addition to refugees, many displaced persons will wish to return to their place of origin, for which assistance will be provided by a variety of United Nations agencies and NGOs.

43. Angola is reported to be the most mine-polluted country in the world. It is estimated that at least 10 million land-mines and pieces of unexploded ordnance have been deposited throughout the country over three decades of conflict. The complexity of the situation presupposes a long-term strategy unfolding in several stages, as the Angolan mine problem will take several decades to resolve. The Central Mine Action Office, in cooperation with UNAVEM, United Nations agencies and NGOs, is developing a comprehensive mine action plan with the following essential elements: a countrywide mine survey, followed by mine clearance in priority areas; a mine-awareness campaign targeting displaced persons and refugees in particular; and the creation of a national institution capable of managing mine-related issues after the completion of the Mission's mandate.

44. The Unit for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, through its Demobilization and Reintegration Office, will also coordinate the operations aimed at supplying food, clothing, health services and agricultural, construction and domestic kits to soldiers in the quartering areas. An initial social reintegration programme will be carried out in each quartering area in the form of information and training workshops. The Unit will have specialists on demobilization and reintegration in each of the quartering areas to oversee these programmes, in collaboration with the UNAVEM camp supervisor and the UNITA camp chief. Strong operational support will be required from the Government of Angola, the specialized agencies and NGOs. As in the case of mine action, a national institution will have to be created to assume responsibility for the reintegration effort as soon as possible.

45. UNAVEM's budget will have to cover part of the human and technical resources required for the mine action, demobilization and reintegration programmes. The personnel working with the Unit will need to be increased to meet the responsibilities described above. Thirteen international Professional posts as well as three international Field Service and local staff posts will be required for this purpose. For the demobilization programme, the assessed budget will provide for food and clothing for the demobilizing soldiers; registration and evaluation of their skills; information and training workshops to prepare them for their return to civilian life; cooking kits; and recreational activities. The mine-action budget will include essential surveying, mine clearance and training of Angolan de-miners.

46. Additional substantial funding for these programmes needs to be raised from the donor community and the Angolan Government. In this connection, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat issued on 1 February an inter-agency humanitarian appeal for Angola in the amount of $213 million, of

which $12.4 million is for mine action and $55.8 million for demobilization and reintegration.

VII. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND COORDINATION

47. The organizational structure of UNAVEM III would be as follows:

(a) The Mission, with headquarters in Luanda, would be headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, assisted by a Deputy Special Representative. The Special Representative would have an office staffed by a director, a special assistant, a political adviser, a spokesperson, a legal adviser and other substantive and support staff. In addition, the Special Representative would also have a small secretariat to assist him in his capacity as Chairperson of the Joint Commission. This secretariat would also assist the Force Commander when chairing joint military meetings;

(b) The political affairs component would be headed by a senior political affairs officer, with officers at each of the six regional headquarters and a headquarters cell in Luanda. This component would also contain a public information section, including the staff necessary for the establishment and operation of a UNAVEM radio station;

(c) The military component would be headed by a force commander, with the rank of Major-General, assisted by a deputy force commander. The component would include military observers, headed by a senior military observer, and formed units. There would be six regional headquarters located in Huambo, Lubango, Luena, Menongue, Saurimo and Uige. There would also be a Demobilization and Reintegration Office of the Unit for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to assist in quartering and demobilization;

(d) The police observer component (CIVPOL), with headquarters in Luanda, would be headed by a chief police observer, with the rank of Chief Superintendent or its equivalent. It would have six regional headquarters co-located and logistically integrated with the military regional headquarters;

(e) The administrative component would be headed by the chief administrative officer.

48. The Unit for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance would continue to be the focal point for coordinating humanitarian operations in Angola, under the authority of my Special Representative.

49. My Special Representative would have overall authority over all activities undertaken by the United Nations in Angola in support of the peace process and would be responsible for the close coordination of all of them. To this effect, integrated teams would be established, composed of various components of the Mission and the Unit for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, to coordinate day-to-day functions and to ensure the most efficient use of available resources. All components would rely on integrated logistic, air support, communication and medical evacuation systems. At the regional, provincial and

local levels, such coordination would be entrusted to senior officers designated by the Special Representative.

VIII. LOGISTIC AND FINANCIAL MATTERS

50. Owing to the devastation of the local economy and infrastructure, UNAVEM would need a highly efficient logistic network that would rely on a well-balanced mix of surface and air transport. The plans for UNAVEM III call for the establishment of a main logistic base in the port city of Lobito, to avoid serious logistic bottlenecks currently experienced at the port and airport of Luanda. This main base would be supplemented by one or two hub stations in the countryside. After carefully considering the cost- and time-effectiveness of the installation of the above-mentioned support system, I believe that the best approach would be to use, for the initial stage of the operation, a self-contained military unit that would be contributed by a Member State. Once a logistic system was fully established, this unit would be replaced by civilian logistic personnel.

51. The Security Council will receive shortly an addendum to the present report containing cost estimates for the enlargement of the United Nations operation in Angola. I have stressed elsewhere in the present report the primary responsibility of the Angolan parties in the implementation of the Lusaka agreements. It is therefore expected that the Angolan parties, in particular the Government of Angola, will provide adequate material support to all elements of UNAVEM.

52. On several occasions, my Special Representative has raised this issue with President dos Santos and various authorities of his Government. On 19 December 1994, the Government of Angola made public a document entitled "Cost of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol" (S/1994/1451), which indicates its plans to contribute nearly US$ 500 million to various programmes associated with the peace process. In particular, the document indicates that the Angolan authorities would be ready to provide to UNAVEM a residential compound, aircraft and vehicle parking facilities, harbour space for vessels, warehouses and office space in ports and airports and fuel at rates below the international price. Exemption from custom formalities and availability of land for the Mission were also pledged.

53. I have instructed my Special Representative to pursue this issue actively with the Government so as to ensure a substantial contribution from Angola to the peace process. At the same time, UNAVEM is discussing with the authorities the need for the Government to de-mine, repair and open as soon as possible major supply routes and airfields, as well as to prepare necessary accommodation and storage facilities throughout the country. It will also be extremely important for the Government to provide to the United Nations certain key services and supplies, including fuel, at the lowest possible cost. The above requirements will have to be properly reflected in the status-of-forces agreement, which should be concluded between the Government of Angola and the United Nations as soon as the Security Council approves a mandate for the new operation.

IX. OBSERVATIONS

54. The signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 20 November 1994 was a critical turning point in the Angolan peace process. That agreement is a manifestation of the desire of the Government of Angola and UNITA to resolve the conflict and re-establish peace through political means. In a letter dated 24 January 1995 addressed to me (S/1995/94, annex), the President of Angola reiterated the commitment of his Government to the full implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. He noted a number of initiatives that had contributed to the creation of a basis for mutual trust between the Government and UNITA and expressed the hope that the Security Council would approve the establishment of UNAVEM III.

55. The cease-fire that entered into force on 22 November 1994 has been generally holding. Although the Government and UNITA have accused each other of cease-fire violations, UNAVEM observers have established that such violations have not been significant. The decision to restore the strength of UNAVEM II to its previous level and the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on 10 January 1995, at which important decisions were taken to help to promote respect for the military parts of the Lusaka Protocol, have helped to consolidate the cease-fire. However, measures need to be taken expeditiously to facilitate further the effective application of the principle of free movement of persons and goods, the effective functioning of the triangular communications system, the start of mine-clearing, and the disengagement of troops in areas of tension.

56. The Joint Commission, established in pursuance of the Lusaka Protocol, has held several sessions since the UNITA delegation returned to Luanda in December 1994; one such meeting was held in Huambo. A series of other high-level contacts between the Government and UNITA officials since the signing of the Lusaka Protocol have contributed to an improvement in relations between the two Angolan parties. I am convinced that an earliest possible meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi could have a major positive impact on the whole peace process.

57. Conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance have improved considerably. It is therefore necessary to mobilize immediately all resources required to stabilize as quickly as possible, and then improve, the situation of populations affected by the war, especially displaced persons. Humanitarian programmes related to mine action, demobilization and reintegration and the resettlement of displaced persons and refugees are also essential for the consolidation of peace in Angola. I therefore encourage donors to respond rapidly and generously to the 1995 United Nations consolidated appeal for Angola, issued by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs on 1 February 1995.

58. In formulating my recommendations for UNAVEM III, I have been guided by some basic considerations. The first is the reaffirmation by both the Government of Angola and UNITA of their commitment to respect and implement the "Acordos de Paz", the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the Lusaka Protocol. Under the Protocol, which was negotiated with the full participation of the three observer States, both parties have called for an enlarged and reinforced role for the United Nations. I am convinced that the United Nations should respond positively to this challenge.

59. Another basic consideration is that the breadth of new responsibilities that the parties, supported by the observer countries, have asked the United Nations to perform, will require a sizeable United Nations presence in Angola. This will enhance the chance of successful implementation of the provisions of the Protocol. However, the Angolan parties themselves must demonstrate strong political will to abide by the commitments they undertook in Lusaka. For the international community, there are obvious risks involved in investing in a new peace-keeping operation in Angola. If the above-mentioned political will is found to be lacking or if the cooperation required from the parties is not forthcoming, I will not hesitate to invite the Security Council to reconsider its commitments in Angola.

60. Given the positive factors described above, particularly the respect for the cease-fire shown by the Government and UNITA, their commitment to ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel and their commitment to the Lusaka process and national reconciliation, I recommend that a new United Nations operation in Angola, UNAVEM III, immediately take over from UNAVEM II; that it have the mandate and strength described in the present report; and that it be initially established for a period of 12 months, subject to review in the light of progress made in the implementation of the Protocol.

Annex

UNAVEM II military and civilian police personnel

(as of 27 January 1995)

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Military medical personnel	Total
Argentina	2	3	0	5
Brazil	19	6	11	36
Congo	2	0	0	2
Guinea-Bissau	11	15	0	26
Hungary	10	15	0	25
India	3	0	0	3
Jordan	20	20	0	40
Malaysia	20	20	0	40
Morocco	0	2	0	2
Netherlands	14	9	0	23
New Zealand	3	0	0	3
Nigeria	19	15	0	34
Norway	4	0	0	4
Slovakia	5	0	0	5
Sweden	18	0	0	18
Zimbabwe	21	17	0	38
Total	171	122	11	304